Die Autoren aus West- und Osteuropa, Kanada und den USA diskutieren Ziele und konzeptionelle Probleme der Sicherheitspolitik nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges und - anhand von formalen Modellen - Bedingungen internationaler Stabilität; Fragen der Nuklearstrategie und Proliferation; Krisenmanagement und friedenserhaltende und -schaffende Strategien; Rüstungskontrollprobleme und Verifikationsfragen. Inhalt: Reiner K. Huber / Rudolf Avenhaus: Modeling for Security Policy in the Post-Cold-War Era: Introductory Note by the Editors (13-22). I. Conceptual Issues of Security Policy in the Post-Cold-War Era: Jörg Schönbohm: The Foundation of German Security and Defense Policy: Stability in the East a Common Interest (25-30); Gwyn Prins: Global Security for the Next Century (31-41); Paul K. Davis: Protecting Weak and Medium-Strength States: Issues of Deterrence, Stability, and Decision-Making (43-67). II. Models of Military Stability: Reiner K. Huber: Military Stability of Multipolar International Systems: Conclusions from an Analytical Model (71-81); Vladimir P. Akimov: Cooperative Games and Multipolar Stability (83-98); Vitaly N. Tsygichko / Fritz Stoeckli: Combat Potential and Operational Planning - Past and Present (99-106); Stephen D. Biddle: Tactical Level Stability Hypotheses and Tests (107-115); Hans W. Hoffmann / Robert Schnurer: Tactical Stability through Delaying Action? - Results of Simulation Experiments (117-130). III. Issues of Nuclear Stability: Vitaly N. Tsygichko: Geopolitical Aspects of Shaping Russia's Nuclear Policy (133-140); Melvin L. Best / Andrei A. Piontkowsky: New Stability Paradigms in the Post-Cold War World: From MAD-Stability toward MAP-Stability (141-152); Michel Rudnianski: Nuclear Proliferation and Deterrence Stability (153-170). IV. Nonmilitary Factors of International Stability: Alexander E. Varshavsky / Leonid E. Varshavsky: On Indicators of Possible Inter-Civilization Conflicts (173-184); Irene Kyriakopoulos: Economic Integration as a Model for Security Cooperation (185-189); Helmut Maneval / Horst Weber: Burden Sharing for Alliance Stability (191-200); Jürgen Scheffran: Modelling Environmental Conflicts and International Stability (201-220); William Kerby / Frank Göbeler: The Distribution of Voting Power in the United Nations (221-230). V. Crisis Management and Peace Support: Wolfgang Balzer: A Theory of Binary Crises (233-252); Seth Bonder: Some Broad Peace Support Operations Research Areas (253-258); Reiner K. Huber / George Miller: A Decision-theoretic Model of Peace Support Strategies (259-277); John Mackinlay / Jørn Olsen: Training for Peace Operations (279-290); Klaus Helling / Swantje von Wachter: Crisis Management Gaming and Computer Support (291-302). VI. Arms Control and Verification: Frank R. Cleminson: Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament in the Post 1995 Era: The Verification Challenge and Response (305-316); Morton J. Canty / Rudolf Avenhaus: Verification, Politics and the Sensible Distribution of Inspection Resources (317-330); D. Marc Kilgour: Provision of Accurate Information in Arms Control (331-342); Nicholas Kyriakopoulos / Rudolf Avenhaus: Dynamic Models in Treaty Verification (343-352).